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INTRODUCTION 
 
Nietzsche’s criticisms were directed against what he reckons as the progressive ‘moral’ 
disintegration of late 19th century Germany. He described morality as “the doctrine of the 
relations of supremacy (Herrschafts-Verhältnissen) under which the phenomenon of ‘life’ comes 
to be.”1 This definition, however, is broad and mired in ambiguity, and as will be pointed out 
later, escapes multitudinous ‘moralities’ available throughout Nietzsche’s corpus which had been 
culled by scholars, such as Heidegger and Solomon.2 
He wished to be called an immoralist in that his project was not to promote any morality 
but to undermine traditional morality, which he accused of decadence. In thus dislodging 
previously unchallenged moral claims anchored on the Enlightenment constancy in reason it was 
imperative for him to act as though a physician that diagnoses the ills of society and prescribes 
radical changes to salvage humanity from such condition by examining the birth of different 
values, the particular values that these values had so far evinced for humankind, as well as an 
account of their evolution. Comparisons too had to be fixed to ascertain commonalities and 
differences in the standards of moral valuations of peoples across epochs and localities.3 And for 
this purpose he employed genealogical method4 to arrive at the origin (Ursprung) of man’s 
morality. In Section 32 of Beyond Good and Evil he charts out three stages of moral 
development in human history: 1) pre-moral (vormoralische); 2) moral (moralische); and 3) 
post-moral (aussermoralische), each having their nuances in interpretations and explanations. 
In the pre-moral period, which occupied the longest part in history, the morality of the 
action was weighed based on the consequences the action in question engendered, so that the 
motivation in agency, and the circumstances surrounding the action is unimportant. During this 
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stage life was subordinated to customs, to what Nietzsche designated as “morality of mores” 
(Sittlichkeit der Sitte). People had to assimilate and tailor their acts according to the existing 
traditions of a society; to be sure some of these traditions are bequeathed uninterruptedly to the 
following generations for the perpetuity of human progress, whilst some are abrogated, whenever 
necessary, as part of the evolutionary adaptation to ensure that customs are yet germane with the 
demands of the times. The custom initially functioned for the preservation of life, for the 
maintenance of a community or people—it has nothing to do with determinations of good and 
bad and moral imperatives. Every practice which from time to time arises in a community should 
receive a dispassionate acceptance from all people, as it was blindly taken that to do otherwise 
could be deleterious insofar as gods of ancestral worship to whom pre-moral peoples owe DEBT 
for their lives and for the munificent graces they were provided—debt in Nietzsche’s On the 
Genealogy of Morals has ramifications as well as psychological and ethological implications—
may serve punishment/s for disobedience. This punishment thereby tends to elicit conformism 
with a herd’s dictates from among all persons in the community, who should forgo their 
individuality and must instead embrace collectivity as their inevitable identity. As regards 
good/bad bifurcation, which in this period the subject still lacked moral imputation of guilt, good 
pertained to a practice that is habitually done and passed from one compeer after another to the 
point that such practice has already acquired ‘reverence’, therefore all the more precluding 
people from drifting away from normatively doing it. On the other hand, bad pertained to any 
change, hence deviation, from what is customary: “change [i]s the very essence of immorality 
(Unsittliche).”5 One was considered immoral (unsittlich) when one uses one’s sense of judgment 
or moral instinct instead of passively following the moral sensibilities of a given culture.6 Be this 
as it may, this era played a significant role in man’s moral development, for instance, in the 
formation of a common character of ‘humanity’ that benchmarked and remained a constituent 
element for all people. 
The next period, moral, spanned the last ten thousand years and marked the transition 
from a morality based on customs to that of an intention-oriented mode for evaluating actions, 
and represented a ‘reversal of perspective’ inasmuch as it underscored the individual’s autonomy 
in valuations as against merely adhering with the established precepts originating from above, 
that is, from a transcendental source or from aristocratic instigations. It is during this stage that 
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people became conscious of themselves not as docile entities which must kowtow with the 
crowd, but an ‘individual’ who has a free will (albeit which Nietzsche considered as modeling 
what is ‘moral’ in the narrower sense, and often leading to dogmatic perversion), and can 
therefore adjudicate and legislate whatever is good or bad for themselves. Corollary to this is the 
fact that people have become subject to moral judgment; that they are accountable for every act 
they do; that amidst their reveling power of willing in no case are they empowered to exercise it 
absolutely, but must defer to a greater Reason7 (Vernunft); and that transgressions to the 
authority of Reason in moral valuations ought to be chastened justly correspondent to the 
gradation of the act thus violated. Nietzsche however saw a fundamental flaw in the moral 
period; he maintained that despite the people’s self-knowledge in human actions they can never 
know the epistemological source or conscious antecedents of the motives which prompts them to 
action—what they hold to be antecedents or motives (arising from their autonomous agency) are 
merely symptomatic of a value rooted in an unconscious source. This criticism led him to posit a 
new period, the extra-moral. 
In extra-moral period it was again necessary to embark on a reversal and fundamental 
shift in values, owing to another self-examination of man. Nietzsche located the value of an 
action in what is ‘unintentional’ in it since everything about an action which is ‘intentional’8 and 
about which we are conscious of is just a surface and so needs to be vivisected further. The 
consequence of the view that the “morality of intentions” merely reveals the external is that 
‘what one is,’ that is, one’s individual character, thoughts and drives, remain hidden and operate 
on the unconscious level. For Nietzsche moral values are indicative of one’s physiological 
constitution; they are like images projected in a mirror from which one could get an insight into 
the actual physiological processes, specifically nervous excitations, occurring in the person. 
Values are physiological demands for the preservation of a certain type of life. Nietzsche 
states, “The standpoint of value is a standpoint of conditions for the preservation and 
enhancement of complex forms of relative life-duration within the flux of becoming.” 9 In this 
sense, values can be looked at in two ways: as a standpoint, and as a demand or condition. 
Valuing as a standpoint implies the espousal of a certain perspective or paradigm in making 
sense of the world, whereas value as a demand or condition, denotes the factual life about human 
beings, i.e. what can only be falsified or ignored but never eradicated; as nourishment is 
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necessary for the body, so values are ineludible not only for the success of a particular group, but 
more so for the survival of humankind.10 Ultimately, for his evaluation of moralities he relied on 
a conception of life based on the will to power to serve as his moral standard, and determiner of 
an order of rank. So an apposite understanding of his critical project requires an exegesis on 
‘life.’ Life is described as a multiplicity of forces connected by a common mode of struggle and 
inequality. Living organisms are systems of forces organized along the lines of commanding and 
obeying. Simply put, some forces command and others obey. The conception of life itself has 
acquired a normative role which can be gleaned from such pronouncements as “the instinctual 
life is the development of the will to power” or that good is that which “heightens the feeling of 
power in man, the will to power, power itself.” We may say that a healthy and ideal morality for 
Nietzsche is that which does not thwart or condemn the ‘instinct of life.’ 
 As a ‘sign-language,’ morality or moralities can only be gauged semiotically with 
physiology as a point of reference; hence they are evaluated according to their overall affects—
regression or decadence, or the affirmation of life—exemplified in humanity’s functioning. 
Nietzsche’s extra-moral stance is aimed at a self-overcoming of morality (die Selbstüberwindung 
der Moral), which however must not be completely severed from the standards of the moral 
period but must be discerningly/selectively assimilated with them in an effort to found a new 
moral paradigm that is ideal for the growth of a “higher humanity” as opposed to a “human, all 
too human” state of existence (unmensch). 
Indeed, he considered it possible to approximate ourselves to a “higher humanity” 
through living an affirmative life—becoming what we are—mediated by the practice of life-
enhancing values, which affirm power as the highest value. “Becoming what one is,” the ideal 
for life-enhancement, then, underscores ethical naturalism (Lamarckism) about values: values 
are historically determined, so that an individual’s possible values are limited by the particular 
type of person he is, and the range of values he is capable of pursuing indicates the type of 
person he is.11 Thus what one is and how one fares is necessarily the function of nature, nurture, 
and life-circumstances. A life-denying ethic can be overcome by willing it, more exactly, by 
affirming one of morality’s highest values, i.e. truth.12 However, such overcoming is not 
empowered to just about anybody but by the epoch itself that has willed its necessity. For just as 
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one’s inheritance of an ethic is the product of a certain history, so one’s overcoming of it can 
occur only at a particular historical moment. 
Simon May fleshed out three criteria for life-enhancement in his reconstruction of 
Nietzsche’s moral philosophy: power, sublimation, and form-creation. Power is an explanatory 
concept and, as already explained, a standard of value. The drive for power accounts for all our 
values and urges including those that are self-effacing and self-denying. Sublimation requires 
discipline that hones and refines the instincts rather than simply suppresses them and that 
enhances the range and alertness of the senses. It enhances life insofar as it enables us to harness 
the creative ends and drives (and the values they express) whose violence might otherwise 
paralyze or annihilate us. Lastly, form-creation refers to that which invites a love of world and 
life. It is found in valuations that glorify life (achieved through philosophy), 13 works of art the 
beautify it (achieved by the creative artist),14 and one’s own character that is pleasing to 
ourselves (achieved by giving style to one’s character). For a maximal life-enhancement to be 
achieved, these three must come together genially.  
Nietzsche’s history of morals, then, is instrumental in utilizing past experiences to 
construct the future. A self-overcoming would entail the recognition that our understanding of 
morality has evolved. Of course, the dominance of the values belonging to the moral period 
would be usurped by the extra-moral period. But it should come as no surprise that this ‘natural 
history of morals’ was not intended as a strictly impersonal, descriptive account of the evolution 
of morality. That Nietzsche’s preoccupation with rebus moralibus was not restricted to a mere 
‘history’ is evident in his major work on morals, On the Genealogy of Morals, to which I now 
turn my attention. 
 
Master vs. Slave Morality15 
 
On the Genealogy of Morals is a polemic concerned to reveal the origin of our moral 
prejudices. In outline, the story told by its first essay is this: in the beginning were the knightly-
aristocratic masters who determined for themselves that they were ‘good’ and that the weak 
unfortunates who lacked masterly qualities were in consequence ‘bad.’ Not surprisingly, the 
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numerous and miserable bad grew increasingly resentful of their lot until in a surprising and 
underdescribed stroke of genius, their ressentiment became creative. The fruit of this creative 
ressentiment was an unheard of new morality—slave morality—at the heart of which is the claim 
that those who had previously been regarded as wretched and bad in fact embody all that is truly 
good in and about humanity. The masters, meanwhile, are, it is said, not good but “evil.” 
The slaves or men or ressentiment’s hatred is universal; they falsify the object of their 
hatred, the master or sovereign individual, in order to render him inescapably blameworthy.16 
They assign whoever they resent to a corrupting realm called the phenomenal, in contrast to a  
truly ‘real’ transcending it altogether. They likewise posit a god who saves the weak and damns 
the strong. And they invent all sorts of philosophical concepts, viz. essence and metaphysically 
free will, so that those who possess strength may be made to feel constitutionally guilty and yet 
still capable of choosing to repudiate what they inescapably are. That is to say, with the aid of 
such fictions17 in the last ‘modus’ indicated, the slave is able to despise and to take revenge upon 
his enemies in effigy, which then brings about a “spiritualization of revenge.”18 In addition, as 
ressentiment is impossible to satisfy, slave’s revenge must be imaginary. 
The priority of the noble/master morality is first mentioned in the middle of On the 
Genealogy of Morals, Essay I, §2. Nietzsche declares that, 
…the judgment good did not originate with those to whom “goodness” was shown! Rather it was 
the “good” themselves, that is to say, the noble, powerful, high-stationed and high-minded who 
felt and established themselves and their actions as good, that is, of the first rank, in 
contradistinction to all that is low, low-minded, common and plebeian. It was out of this pathos of 
distance that they first seized the right to create values and to coin names for things. 
 
Above all else, then, noble morality is self-established, it “develops from a triumphant 
affirmation of itself”19; it is the morality of self-glorification (Selbstverherrlichung). It is wrong 
to think that morality originates in the favorable assessment of self-sacrifice and unegoistic 
behavior generally, or that morality has always rested upon the value of utility. For Nietzsche, 
noble morality is essentially bound up with an exuberant transcendence of the standpoint of 
utility, a loft disregard for the values of mere comfort and survival.20 
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A crucial part of what the nobles affirm about themselves, therefore, is their ability to 
raise themselves above the common crowd and its concern for comfort and survival. Nietzsche 
speaks of an “aristocratic value-equation according to which “good = noble = powerful = 
beautiful = happy = God-beloved.”21 We see from this that at the bottom of the self-affirmation 
of Nietzsche’s nobles is their delight in their own abundant energy and abilities. Nobles seek to 
give expression to their felt fullness of power by engaging in certain sorts of activity, initially 
one that demand strenuous physical effort and involve taking large and dramatic risks—war, 
adventure, and hunting, for example. By the very fact that they choose to engage in them, nobles 
take themselves to honor such activities, and they then instinctively begin a cycle of self-
reinforcement by honoring themselves for being so good at these honorable pursuits. They set 
deliberately exigent standards of excellence and then think well of themselves when they pass 
with supreme aplomb. 
Because the criteria of nobility are self-appointed, noble values are, in the end, self-
generated and self-grounded. But because measuring up to these criteria is often a matter of 
readily ascertainable fact, not datable opinion, because superiority in respect of strength, daring, 
or prowess, for example, can to a great degree be eliminated objectively, we can nevertheless 
specify certain features of noble lives that account for their favorable self-evaluation: namely, 
their ability to hit the target they have set for themselves. The most important feature of the 
activities through which nobles characteristically manifest their zest for life is, I suggest, that is 
“free,” engaged in for its own sake, not demanded by material circumstance or external 
authority. Noble morality, I shall say, is a morality of intrinsic value, of lives lived for the sake of 
the happiness inseparable from engaging in actions and activities deemed worthwhile in and of 
themselves, together with the honor consequent upon excelling at such actions and activities in 
the eyes of one’s peers.22 
The powerful physicality and hearty ferocity of Nietzsche’s early nobles is of a piece 
with their “crude, coarse, external, narrow, and altogether unsymbolical” habits of mind.23 
Although the master do value distinguishable qualities and activities intrinsically, they 
experience each element in their “value-equation” as part of an indivisible, tangible whole; they 
experience the several elements through the filter of the single “Urwert” of being and doing as 
we do. As a result, readers of On the Genealogy of Morals cannot experience life as Nietzsche 
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imagines the originators of noble morality to have experienced it; their form of life is practically 
inaccessible to modern men and women. It does not follow from this, though, that the 
perspective of master morality is epistemically unavailable to inhabitants of the modern world. 
Master values are not so bizarre as to render it doubtful that we can understand what it might 
have been like to live in accordance with them. 
In On the Genealogy of Morals we are informed that: 
[I]n the majority of cases [those who feel themselves to be men of a higher rank] designate 
themselves simply by their superiority in power (as “the powerful,” “the masters,” “the 
commanders”) or by the most clearly visible signs of this superiority, for example as “the rich,” 
“the possessors.” … But they also do it by a typical character trait: … They call themselves, for 
instance, “the truthful.”24 
 
Nietzsche’s point here is not that the primitive nobles assumed strict causal connections 
interlinking power, wealth, truthfulness and courage, nor that they regarded the relevant nouns as 
synonymous terms. If they had held the latter view, it would be questionable whether we could 
understand their form of life at all. Any group that could not see that being disposed to tell the 
truth and being wealthy are two different things would be at least as odd as a group that seemed 
to recognize no distinction between, say, being fleet of foot and being a good cook. If they had 
held the former view, it would seem that they would have had to accept the truth of conditionals 
such as: (a) if one who is poor and weak were to become rich and powerful. But on Nietzsche’s 
account, these conditionals would have been scarcely intelligible to anyone, master or slave, 
living in the epoch of “pure” master morality. And if these claims could have been made 
intelligible to the masters, they would have rejected them, just as the members of a present day 
teenage “in crowd” would reject the claim that if one dresses like the in crowd, one will acquire 
the desired traits of its members.25 Nietzschean nobles before the advent of slave morality tacitly 
held a very crude “unity of the virtues” thesis. 
The early nobles are too intellectually primitive to be able to defend, or even articulate, 
their sense that their several virtues naturally belong together, and it is just this incapacity that 
will render their world vulnerable to the corrosive influence of slave morality. The inability 
discursively to account for themselves certainly indicates that the early masters are unreflective; 
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but it does not entail that their favorable self-evaluation is merely a groundless prejudice. In fact, 
we have seen that Nietzsche’s claim that the origin of the opposition of “good” to “bad” is found 
in “the pathos of distance” presupposes that the self-exaltation of the masters has a significant 
basis in fact rather than fiction or delusion. Nietzsche is not himself to the noble identification of 
“superior in certain respects”—better at running, jumping, hunting, dancing, fighting or 
commanding for example—with “just plain superior,” “intrinsically better for all,” but he clearly 
does regard the achievements of the nobles in respect of the relevant activities and virtues to be 
real, matters of (pre)-historical fact rather than sheer mystification. It is indeed largely because of 
this basis in fact that the pejorative view of the slavish “other” entailed by noble morality is held 
by Nietzsche to be something of a logically necessary afterthought; to the nobles, “the bad” are 
simply those who lack the distinctive ensemble of desirable qualities that they have. The 
distinction introduced by the slave revolt in morality, between good and evil, marks a radically 
different sort of contrast. 
Nietzsche takes pain to emphasize that when slave moralists deny that the masters are 
good, they are using a different sense of the word “good” from that embodied in master morality, 
and that in order to think of the masters as evil, the slaves must first “dye [them] in another color, 
interpret [them] in another fashion, see [them] in another way, through the venomous eye of 
ressentiment.26 When the eye of ressentiment looks at the nobles, it does not see the tightly 
wound skein of power, wealth, courage, truthfulness and the like that the nobles themselves had 
perceived; it sees instead only cruelty, tyranny, lustfulness, insatiability, and godlessness.27 Once 
the ressentiment of the weak has become creative and given birth to a new kind of morality, the 
slaves are able when they look at themselves no longer to see unrelenting, unredeemed misery 
and wretchedness, but rather a new kind of goodness, constituted by the voluntary cultivation of 
patience, humility and justice.28 
The most important accomplishment of slave morality for Nietzsche is not its turning the 
tables on the masters and deeming the erstwhile bad to be good and erstwhile good to be evil; 
what is most important about slave morality is that it does this by inventing a new type of values, 
impartial value. Slave morality is the morality of impartial value in that it is the morality of 
value chosen by an (allegedly) impartial subject, more precisely a subject who is in himself 
neither master nor slave but can freely choose to behave and to evaluate either as the one or as 
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the other. Slave moralists, says Nietzsche, “maintain no belief more ardently than the belief that 
the strong man is free to be weak and the bird of prey to be a lamb—for thus they gain the right 
to make the bird of prey accountable for being a bird of prey.”29 
The idealized relationship between nobles and subjects that Nietzsche imagines to have 
been the norm throughout pre- and early history is most obviously exemplified in the pre-history 
of one particular culture, that of classical Greece. Nietzsche’s model for the ethos of primeval 
man is unmistakably the ethos of Homeric man. So it is not surprising to find Nietzsche’s central 
claim splendidly illustrated by Odysseus’s treatment of Thersites in Book Two of the Iliad. After 
Thersites berates Agamemnon for his part in the quarrel with Achilles and bemoans the fate of 
the Achaeans in the war, Odysseus intervenes with the following pronouncement: 
Fluent orator though you be, Thersites, your words are ill-considered. Stop, nor stand up alone 
against princes. Out of all those who came beneath Illion with Atreides I assert there is no worse 
man than you are. Therefore, you shall not lift up your mouth to argue with princes, cast 
reproaches into their teeth, nor sustain the homegoing… You argue nothing but scandal. And this 
also I will tell you, and it will be a thing accomplished. If once more I find you playing the fool as 
you are now, nevermore let the head of Odysseus sit on his shoulders, let me nevermore be called 
Telemachos’ father, if I do not take you and strip away your personal clothing, your mantle and 
your tunic that cover over your nakedness, and send you thus bare and howling back to the fast 
ships, whipping you out of the assembly place with the strokes of indignity.30 
 
Odysseus’s message is chillingly clear: neither the views nor the well-being of Thersites (and his 
ilk) are of the slightest concern to the commanders and heroes. 
In light of the “pathos of distance” separating the nobles from the inferiors, it needs to be 
asked how slave morality, how this sublimely subtle slave revolt succeeded in a way 
unparalleled by any political or economic revolt of the poor and the weak against the strong and 
the wealthy. The chief explanatory mechanism offered by the Genealogy is guilt; masters lose 
their grip on their own morality by being made to feel guilty for being masters and adhering to 
master morality. As Nietzsche puts it, “men of ressentiment” could achieve “the ultimate, 
subtlest, sublimest triumph of revenge … if they succeeded in forcing their own misery, forcing 
all misery, into the consciences of the fortunate so that one day the fortunate began to be 
ashamed of their good fortune and perhaps said to one another: ‘it is disgraceful to be fortunate; 
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there is too much misery.’”31 How, though, was the job begun? It may be that the first step is to 
persuade the nobles that they are accountable for their lives and their values, but it still needs to 
be asked how masters could ever be persuaded of anything by slaves, given that they rarely 
speak to them at all and tend, when they do, to remain in the imperative mood. 
Nietzsche’s nobles are not inarticulate, but rather dialectically incompetent. It is only 
because they are articulate that they can be argued into granting that they are free to choose 
whether and how to allow expression to their deepest urges to act, and it is only because they are 
dialectically incompetent that they can be argued into granting this point, which Nietzsche 
himself believes to be false and pernicious. 
A precondition of the masters’ being coaxed into examining the slave morality was their 
having already developed amongst themselves the practice of settling certain issues by 
persuasion rather than by force. Not only does Nietzsche represent his nobles as articulate, he 
also describes them as, in their relations with one another, wonderfully “resourceful 
[erfinderisch] in consideration, self-control, delicacy, loyalty, pride, and friendship.” By frightful 
contrast, in their relation with the bad or the alien they could (and often apparently did) behave 
“not much better than uncaged beasts of prey.”32 Master morality thus operates (without a second 
thought) according to a double standard; conduct that would not become a noble in his dealings 
with peers is not regarded as similarly disgraceful vis-à-vis those beyond the pale.33 Before the 
advent of slave morality, this double standard is held not to have given the nobles any pause; 
they practiced it, Nietzsche would have us believe, on a good conscience. 
Nobles are infected with bad conscience when they become convinced—more accurately 
“half-convinced”—that they are not simply responsible for certain things as nobles, but are 
responsible for being noble, for living the lives they do. When this happens they are halfway to 
being (half)convinced that they are not justified in thinking of themselves in the way they had 
done. The inability of the masters to justify themselves before the bar of the impartial value is the 
result principally of their inability intellectually to defend two features of their outlook: the 
double standard that allows the bad or the alien to be treated ignobly, and the powerful 
physicality that infuses the activities that nobles value intrinsically. 
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Bad Conscience 
 
Nietzsche introduces the bad conscience early on in the second treatise. The bad 
conscience, we read in section 17, originates in people oppressed by intruders, the notorious 
“pack of blond beasts of prey, a conqueror- and master-race”, which “puts its terrible claws on a 
perhaps numerically vastly superior, but formless still spreading population.” Thereby these 
intruders bring the “most thorough of all changes” man has lived to see.34 The idea seems to be 
that people are living more or less by themselves, following heir instincts for food, shelter, sex, 
and as Nietzsche emphasizes, their drives for aggression. Then some groups get organized, and 
start oppressing others that do not. Nietzsche insists that these conquests happen abruptly. In the 
course of long, gradual colonization, wild drives may become domesticated, which might soften 
the impact of the change. As it is, the instincts do not gradually become domesticated, but are 
vehemently tuned inwards.35 The oppressed are prevented from letting their instincts act against 
others, and Nietzsche must have in mind here the instincts for aggression, i.e., “enmity, cruelty, 
the lust for pursuit, for raid, for change, for destruction”.36 The oppressed are forced to redirect 
these instincts inwards since otherwise they are threatened with severe punishment. So from now 
on, the oppressed treat themselves in ways similar to those in which they used to treat others, and 
to ways in which they themselves are still treated by the oppressors. Nietzsche presents the 
image of an incarcerated animal that beats itself raw on the bars of its cage.37 He calls this 
inward-direction of previously outward-directed instincts the internalization (Verinnerlichung) 
of man, and regards it as the origin not only of the bad conscience, but also of what should come 
to be called the soul, which is a creation of Christianity. 
There is a point that should make us pause when reading Nietzsche’s own account of the 
origin of the bad conscience. One may wonder when, where, and to whom all this happened. In 
particular, who was oppressed and who were the oppressors? Nietzsche does not indicate which 
era he is thinking of. All we can tell is that he is talking about a ‘pre-historic’ time before the 
development of state-like communities, but also before the rise of Christianity, since Christianity 
appears when the consequences of the conquest are already in place.38 To see why this lack of 
specificity should not worry us, it is helpful to recall that, on his postcard to Overbeck from 
January 1888, Nietzsche points out that he is far from explaining Christianity in terms of only 
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one psychological category.39 In view of that point, I submit that Nietzsche’s interest is in 
exploring how morality , i.e., Christian morality, could have arisen in the course of human 
history when only basic assumptions about human psychology are in place. Moreover, 
Nietzsche’s concern is to show how moral phenomena could have arisen in ways that are not 
only surprising, but appalling. As far as the development of the early form of the bad conscience 
is concerned, these assumptions are about aggressive instincts. The historical presentation serves 
only as a medium for exploring the effects of such psychological assumptions. Put differently, 
the On the Genealogy of Morals is a polemic (Streitschrift, which is the subtitle of the work), and 
its ultimate goal is to contribute to the ‘revaluation of values.’ To that end, then, Nietzsche 
focuses only on the most significant parts of the historical events at issue, i.e., the moral 
psychology that figures in the genealogy of morality. 
The effects of the development that leads to the early form of the bad conscience are 
immense. It is only at this stage of the development of the mental that much of what we associate 
with human intellectual and spiritual activity becomes possible. Among other things, Nietzsche 
points out that it is only through the rise of the older form of the bad conscience that we can 
understand ‘contradictory notions’40 such as selflessness, self-denial, and self-sacrifice as ideals. 
More generally, only from now on can we understand the ‘un-egoistic’ as a value. But why 
would he claim that? The same theme concerned Nietzsche as early as Human, All Too Human41 
section 57, where he discusses examples of behavior instantiating such values: a good author 
with a concern for his subject wishes that another might come and destroy him by discussing the 
subject more clearly; or a soldier wishes to die for his victorious country. A necessary condition 
for values such as selflessness to be comprehensible is that a single person to be thought of not, 
as he says, a plurality within a unity. But only after the oppression of instincts is there a 
sufficiently rich inner life to allow for such ideas. From then on, a person is, for better or worse, 
a plurality owing to the presence of different and competing instincts. According to Nietzsche, 
there is still nothing un-egoistic, but we can now at least see how it was entirely absurd any more 
to develop such a notion: a person becomes praised as un-egoistic or selfless if a drive within 
himself that is beneficent to others leads to action. It is in this way that the internalization of 
instincts and its consequences render the idea of selflessness ay least intelligible.42 
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The development of the early form of inner world also provides the foundations for 
reflectiveness. Nietzsche does not speak about reflectiveness explicitly. Rather, he says that a 
person now gives himself a share and can envisage ‘ideal and imaginative events’ as part of a 
vision. It seems to be this more advanced degree of internalization that Nietzsche also has in 
mind in Beyond Good and Evil section 257, where we read that without internalization culture is 
impossible. In contrast to slaves suffering from this internalization, the beasts of prey are ‘wholer 
men’, since they do not suffer from inner conflict due to the oppression of instincts. Yet this also 
means that they fail to contribute to the development of culture, which is prompted by the growth 
of the mental. The oppressors initiate the development that leads to the growth of the mental, but 
it is the slaves who bring about cultural achievements, and do so in virtue of being slaves. 
Eventually, there are no beasts of prey left since in due course they get absorbed into the form of 
life created by their slaves and thus by the enslavement that they themselves start.43 
 
Indebtedness to Ancestors and Gods44 
 
Nietzsche starts discussing debtor-creditor relationships45 immediately after raising his 
initial question about the origin of the bad conscience as a feeling of guilt early on in the 
treatise.46 Having debts is a purely juridical relationship, and whatever emotional or moral 
connotations the concept of guilt may have, those do not pertain to this original relationship of 
having debts. One variant of this relationship is the debt of the offspring towards the ancestors in 
virtue of the latter’s contributions to the flourishing of the tribe.47 On the strength of these 
achievements the offspring owe sacrifices to the ancestors, just as they would owe gratitude to 
living benefactors. The offspring’s debts grow the more they succeed, and eventually, the 
ancestors transfigure into gods. Debts towards ancestors on the side of successful clans spread 
through mankind via their conquests for the submitted population receives and continues the 
tradition of giving sacrifices to the ancestors of the conquerors.48 
Nietzsche tells us at the beginning of section 21 that up to that point there is no moral 
connotation to the notion of Schuld (guilt). Guilt comes into existence after the old form of the 
bad conscience and indebtedness have merged. But before I proceed to discuss this next step in 
the development of the bad conscience, we should have a closer look at Nietzsche’s remarks on 
the debtor-creditor relationship for doing so will prove illuminating for his understanding of 
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morality. As Nietzsche puts out in section 4, there is an old idea that originates in the debtor-
creditor relationship, namely, the idea that every damage has its equivalent and can be paid off in 
some way. The origin of this idea is that a debtor who cannot pay his creditor is forced to give 
the creditor something else that he owns. This may amount to letting the creditor inflict torture 
on the creditor. As Nietzsche informs us in section 6, the reason why inflicting pain can have this 
function is because people actually enjoy watching torture or inflicting pain themselves. An 
individual’s relationship with his community is also a debtor-creditor relationship. The 
community grants him protection, and in turn requires that he individual pay back his debts 
towards the community by way of respecting certain rules of conduct. For all these debtor-
creditor relationships, there is a background assumption that the people involved are roughly 
equally powerful.49 These ideas give rise to an idea of justice as a principle both for interaction 
among individuals and for communities as a whole, and this idea is that “everything can be paid 
off, and everything must be paid off.” 
The reason why this is worth elaborating is because these thoughts provide him with a 
naturalistic approach to at least simple moral codes. Depending on how one interprets the 
background assumption that people are supposed to be roughly equally powerful, this principle 
may account for more than very simple moral codes.50 If it is right that such forms of conduct 
can indeed be regarded as moral codes, then, no matter what the purpose of the On the 
Genealogy of Morals is, Nietzsche cannot intend to dismiss all of morality. We should keep in 
mind that Nietzsche has developed here a viewpoint from which he can account for codes that 
one may classify as moral, but without appeal to notions such as guilt, and without any appeal to 
Christianity. So these moral codes are thoroughly grounded in this world, so to speak.51 
 
Bad Conscience and Guilt: How they are Combined 
 
We have followed Nietzsche through his discussions of the two elements from which the 
current meaning of the bad conscience descends, the bad conscience as the result of the 
internalization of instincts and the indebtedness to gods. We have now reached section 21, where 
these two elements are combined to give rise to the bad conscience as a feeling of guilt. At the 
beginning of section 21, Nietzsche says that he has not yet told us anything about the actual 
moralization of the notions of debts and duty. As he explains in brackets, this moralization is 
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brought about through the pushing-back of those notions into the conscience with the concept of 
God.52 Our next task is to explain this pushing back of the indebtedness into the bad 
conscience.53 
It is clear on textual grounds that Nietzsche thinks that an explanation of the ‘pushing-
back’ requires a third element in addition to the indebtedness to the ancestors and gods and the 
early form of the bad conscience, that is, the joint presence of these two elements by itself does 
not lead to the moralization of the notions of debt and duty.54 This third element is Christianity, 
and it is through the interaction of Christianity with the early form of the bad conscience and the 
indebtedness that the bad conscience as a feeling of guilt arises. Let us focus, then, on how 
Nietzsche introduces Christianity. The stage is set by the concluding remarks of section 20, 
where Nietzsche finishes his story about the development of indebtedness towards ancestors and 
gods with the Christian ‘maximal God.’ Throughout section 21, then, we find key terms of 
Christian theology (e.g. eternal punishment, Adam, hereditary sin, etc.), and that section ends 
with a reference to the Christian God sacrificing himself out of love for his “debtors”. In the light 
of all this, it is clear that the notion of God that the bad conscience gets involved with is the 
Christian notion of God. The aforementioned key terms of Christian theology then provide 
valuable hints for the interpretation of section 21.55 Similar considerations can also be made with 
respect to section 22. 
Roughly speaking, my account of the ‘pushing-back’ is this: Christianity, notably the 
ascetic priest discussed in the third treatise, invents what Nietzsche calls an ethical world order, 
i.e., a comprehensive metaphysical and ethical outlook focused on the notion of the omnipresent, 
omniscient, omnipotent God who both creates the world and everything in it and gives divine 
commandments regulating the proper conduct of his creatures. This ethical world order provides 
a meaning for suffering and misery. Let me call this account the Christian story. The ‘pushing-
back’ of the indebtedness into the bad conscience is plausibly understood as a psychological 
consequence of accepting the Christian story. Its acceptance gives rise to an entirely new 
sentiment, namely guilt, which is so strong that by itself it gives rise to a new kind of moral 
psychology. What used to be a sense of having debts towards ancestors and gods is now 
transformed, that is, ‘pushed back’, into a much more entrenched, much more profound, and 
much more demanding sentiment. So Christianity interacts with the indebtedness towards the 
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gods and ancestors by transforming this into a new sentiment (which may not have arisen 
otherwise). The original form of the bad conscience is relevant to this account because it 
provides a kind of psychology that is capable of producing such a sentiment in the first place. 
Here then is the Christian story in more detail: the founders of Christianity find oppressed 
people tormented by internalized instincts and by the general misery of living the life of the 
oppressed. These people suffer, and they are searching for an explanation of why life is like that. 
As Nietzsche says in the third treatise of the On the Genealogy of Morals, they are looking for a 
culprit, somebody to blame for their misfortunes.56 Christianity names one, claiming that the 
oppressed themselves are to blame. What at first may appear to be a rather peculiar claim looks 
more plausible once it is embedded into the Christian ethical world order. Christian metaphysics 
describes a divine order according to which things and beings have their special place in the 
functioning of the whole by the will of God, and according to which there are good and bad 
character traits and right and wrong actions, which are good or right insofar as they are in 
harmony with the divine order. Many of man’s natural instincts, in particular the instincts for 
aggression, come to be seen as dispositions to violate the divine order, that is, as sins.57 Within 
this framework, the suffering that the instincts cause may be seen as the pain from the struggle of 
the good inclinations against the bad ones, or as a form of preliminary punishment already on 
earth for the presence of bad dispositions. Christianity thus gives a meaning to the suffering by 
explaining why it is perfectly in order. 
There is, however, much more to the Christian story. Man is God’s creature, and so by 
violating God’s commands he acts against what he is first and foremost, that is, he acts against 
his very own nature. By thinking of God as giving commandments regulating the lives of his 
creatures, Christianity creates a point of view from which the ultimate judgment is passed in 
view of how man conducts himself with respect to the ethical world order. Being condemned 
from that point of view means being condemned without restrictions. This should be taken quite 
literally, for eternal punishment is among the sanctions that threaten the transgressors. 
Now, finally, we are in a position to see what the ‘pushing-back’ of the indebtedness into 
the bad conscience amounts to and how this leads to guilt. Prior to the development of 
Christianity, religion is a practice of sacrifices to ancestors and gods as an expression of gratitude 
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for their contributions to the thriving of the tribe. Failing to pay one’s debts by no means 
decreases one’s worth as a person, simply because there is no point of view from which one’ 
overall worth as a person is assessed. In the Christian story, debts to God are immense, and they 
are not even individually acquired, but come along with the very fact of one’s being human 
through hereditary sin. Moreover, any thought of redeeming them seems absurd since man’s 
nature is full of dispositions to violate the divine order and thereby to increase his indebtedness 
to God for, recall, this point explains the suffering in the first place. The original indebtedness is 
thereby transformed into a much more profound, much more persistent and much more 
tyrannizing sentiment, a sentiment that can only arise once there is a privileged point of view 
from which one’s worth as a person is assessed. The original indebtedness turns into a deep 
sense of being a complete failure with respect to what one is first and foremost, namely, God’s 
creature. It is in this way that the sense of having debts is ‘pushed back’ into the inner world,58 
i.e., into the bad conscience at the early stage. The indebtedness has turned into guilt. As a 
consequence of the ‘pushing-back’ the bad conscience “fixes itself firmly, eats into him [the 
debtor], spreads out, and grows into a polyp in every breadth and depth.”59 The feeling of guilt is 
so dominant in the inner space that constitutes that the bad conscience is ultimately identified 
with this feeling of guilt. So the bad conscience as a feeling of guilt has finally emerged.60 
Yet by providing a meaning for the suffering in this way, the ascetic priest has succeeded 
in relieving the pain while poisoning the wound61, that is, the suffering is not meaningless any 
more, but the price to pay is the bad conscience as a feeling of guilt. To understand the meaning 
of suffering, man has to condemn himself. Eventually, the existence of guilt is accepted to such 
an extent that even the accused in witchcraft trials, victims of this way of giving meaning to life, 
would believe in its reality.62 The only temporary relief to the ever growing guilt of humankind 
is what the guilt of humankind is what Nietzsche calls the stroke of genius of Christianity, i.e., 
God sacrificing himself for the guilt of man.63 However this temporary relief also implies that 
man’s guilt, from then on, is so great that even the strongest conceivable means could not 
possibly relieve it.64 
Ascetic Ideal 
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Nietzsche goes on to describe the whole variety of ascetic ideals and practices which the 
priest has promoted to preserve a declining life, and to ensure its continued sickness. He relates 
the innocent forms of the ascetic ideal which tend towards ‘self-narcosis’ and allow the slave to 
avoid the reproach which his own existence offers him. In this category are the hermit’s fasting 
and withdrawal from life; complete immersion in some form of mechanical activity; and “petty 
devotion to others”—an involvement in the communal life of the herd which allows the 
individual to forget himself in the shadow of something grander. More dramatically, Nietzsche 
then reviews the ‘guilty’ forms of asceticism: the penitent’s scourge, the hair shirt and starving 
body, and the dancing epidemics of the Middle Ages. He claims that all ‘remedies’ sought to 
deaden man’s secret suffering through the production of an orgy of feeling—although their final 
effect has only been to weaken man even further. 
At the end Nietzsche turns to the state of contemporary scholarship, to argue that in 
modern times yet another version of the ascetic ideal has become dominant: one that is manifest 
by the scholar’s unselfish devotion of the ‘truth’, for which he is ready to sacrifice anything, 
including himself. Thus he talks of “The proficiency of our finest scholars, their heedless 
industry, their heads smoking day and night, their very craftsmanship,” and he comments “how 
often the real meaning of this lies in the desire to keep something hidden from oneself! Science 
as a means of self-narcosis: do you have experience of that?”65We should notice, however, that 
the ascetic ideal of the scholar is definitely not a function of his religious belief. Indeed, in 
several passages Nietzsche emphasizes that such a total devotion to the ‘truth’ eventually leads 
every good scholar away from the lie which supports the belief in God; and in this respect, the 
will to truth brings about the complete self-overcoming of Christianity and Christian morality. 
Hence, in promoting this form of asceticism, Nietzsche’s priest must survive the abandonment of 
explicitly religious forms. Nietzsche suggest the necessity for a continual revision of the 
genealogy of morals for the priest can always assume new masks, though the ultimate effect of 
his machinations will always be the same. 
Finally, then, as the heirs of all priests’ disastrous remedies, Nietzsche gives us to 
understand that the overall tendency of the priestly ideal has actually been to diminish man 
completely, and to turn him into a timid herd animal. And he concludes that the continual 
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suppression of the individual will has its issue in ‘will-lessness’ as the basic characteristic of 
modern life: 
We can no longer conceal from ourselves what is expressed by all that willing which has taken its 
direction from the ascetic ideal: this hatred of the human, and even more of the animal, and more 
still of the material, this horror of the senses, of reason itself, this fear of happiness and beauty, 
this longing to get away from all appearance, change, becoming, death, wishing, from longing 
itself—all this means—a will to nothingness, an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most 
fundamental presuppositions of life.66 
And again, 
… the diminution and leveling of European man constitutes our greatest danger… We can see 
nothing today that wants to grow greater, we suspect that things will continue to go down, down to 
become thinner, more good natured, more prudent, more comfortable, more mediocre, more 
indifferent, more Chinese, more Christian — there is no doubt that man is getting ‘better’ all the 
time. Here precisely is what has become a fatality for Europe—together with the fear of man have 
also lost our love of him, our reverence for him, our hopes for him, even the will to him. The sight 
of man now makes us weary — what is nihilism today if it is not that? — We are weary of man.67 
Genealogy has revealed the will to nothingness as the fundamental will of history, and 
Nietzsche equates this will to nothingness, this “last will of man,” with the progress of nihilism. 
In other words, the meaning of nihilism is nothing other than the triumph of the slave and the 
continued destruction of the individual as such. And, as the artist of such history the priest is 
finally revealed as the world-historical agent of nihilism itself. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Nietzsche, indeed, revalues and inverts the established values. His genealogy is an 
attempt to force the will of millennia upon new tracks by recollecting all that was nonsense and 
accident in our history, and showing how it may be redeemed with the return of the master or the 
sovereign individual, as the fulfillment of the individual life. In this way Nietzsche suggests that 
the slave may free himself from the cancer of ressentiment, for the will loses “its ill-will against 
time,” when, as a sovereign will, it finally becomes capable of embracing every stage of its 
accidental history as a necessary moment of its self-appropriation. And hence, on both the 
21 
 
individual and world-historical levels, Nietzsche’s typology of masters and slaves is a 
performative critique since it promotes the possibility of a transformation of types.68 
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